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Radical changes proposed to 
the law of corruption
by Stephen Silber QC
The Government is considering proposals from the Law Commission for changes to the 
law of corruption, which at present has many defects, not least because it is drawn from 
a multiplicity of sources. Stephen Silber outlines the background to the Commission's
views.
The Law Commission decided to look at the law of corruption in response to calls from two important committees   the Salmon Commission and the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life   for a review of this 
branch of the law. These calls were not surprising as there are 
many defects in the present law. It is, for example, drawn from 
a multiplicity of sources, including many overlapping common 
law offences and at least eleven statutes.
The problems are illustrated by the uncertainty on the 
important issue of the precise mental condition that has to be 
proved before a person can be found guilty of corruption. At 
common law, corruption has been defined as the receiving or 
offering of any undue reward from a person, in order to 
influence his behaviour in office and to incline him 'to act 
contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity' (Russell on 
Crime, 12th ed. (1964) p. 381). It is difficult to be sure what 
mens rea is covered and similar problems arise with the statutory 
provisions which use the word 'corruptly' but it has been rightly 
pointed out that the authorities on its meaning are in 
'impressive disarray'. The problem is that the majority views in 
the leading case say that 'corruptly' means 'to be purposely 
doing an act which the law forbids as intending to corrupt' 
(Cooper v Slade (1857) 6 HL Case 746, 773 per Wills J).
There are other problems with the present law because it is 
dependent on a distinction between public and non-public 
bodies. There is great uncertainty as to what constitutes a public 
body, especially as many former public bodies have now been 
privatised and it is unclear which of them, if any, can still be 
regarded as public bodies.
THE COURSE OF THE PROJECT
As usual, the Law Commission consulted with a number of 
interested parties before producing its consultation paper 
(Corruption (1997), Consultation Paper No. 145). After its 
publication in March 1997 we allowed a period of more than 
three months for responses.
We received a large number of thoughtful and usefulo o
responses from many with an interest in or knowledge of the 
matters covered by the paper. In the light of the responses, we 
formulated our policy and published our report in March 1998 
(Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (1998) Law Com 248), 
with a dratt bill.
OUR PROPOSED NEW OFFENCES
The law of corruption seeks to address the problems of a
person being encouraged to act in breach of duty by means of a 
reward. We began our analysis of corruption in terms of an 
'agent' being tempted by bribery to betray the trust owed to his 
or her principal, using the concept of 'agent' in a broad sense of 
someone who has agreed to perform functions for another 
person   the agent's 'principal'. We then extended the analysis 
to include those who have been entrusted to perform a 
function, not for an identifiable principal but for the public, 
whether the public of the UK or elsewhere. Significantly, this 
would enable the UK to comply with the Organisation for1 J O
Economic Co-operation and Development Convention.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Our recommendations are to replace the existing common 
and statutory law of corruption with a modern statute creating 
four offences:
  corruptly conferring, or offering or agreeing to confer, an 
advantage;o
  corruptly obtaining, soliciting or agreeing to obtain an 
advantage;
  corrupt performance by an agent of his or her functions as an 
agent
  receipt by an agent of a benefit which consists of, or is derived 
from, an advantage which the agent knows or believes to have 
been corruptly obtained.
The third and fourth of these offences represent a 
strengthening of the law. At present an agent commits an offence 
by accepting a corrupt bribe or reward. This seems illogical. 
What makes bribery wrong is that it tempts an agent to betray 
his or her principal's trust; yet, while the acceptance of the bribe 
is an offence, the betrayal itself is not. At present, prosecutions 
sometimes fail because there is evidence that an agent acted in 
breach of his or her duty, but not that a bribe or reward was paid 
or even agreed. Under our recommendations, it would be 
sufficient to prove that the agent's conduct was motivated by the 
hope of a corrupt reward, whether or not there was any 
agreement to that effect.
Again, it is not clear at present whether an agent commits an 
offence by accepting part of a bribe paid to a third party, in 
return for favour to be shown by the agent. Under our 
recommendations this would be an offence.
THE 'CORRUPTLY' CONCEPT
Central to all these offences is the concept of doing something
corruptly. This word is used in the existing
legislation but is not defined and, as I have
shown, its precise meaning is unclear. We
believe that it should be defined and have
therefore attempted to analyse what it
means. Our conclusion is that the essence of
corruption lies in the influencing of an
'agent' (that is, a person who has agreed to
perform functions for another person   the agent's 'principal'  
or for the public) to perform those functions in a certain way;
and to do so in return (or at least primarily in return) for
conferring of an advantage on the agent or a third partv. Thus weo o o r ,
recommend that a person who confers an advantage should be 
regarded as doing so corruptly if he or she intends a person, in 
performing his or her functions as an agent, to do an act or 
make an omission, and he or she believes that, if that person did 
so, it would probably be primarily in return Jor the conferring of the 
advantage.
The concept of corruption that we recommended in the 
other offences would build upon the concept of corruptly 
conferring an advantage. For example, we recommended that a 
person who obtains an advantage should be regarded as 
obtaining it corruptly if he or she knows or believes that the 
person conferring it confers it corruptly, and he or she either 
requests it or at least consents to obtaining it.
Read literally, these definitions would include an agent's 
remuneration by his or her principal (or on behalf of the 
public), and we therefore recommend an express exception for 
such remuneration. We also recommend a further exception for 
the case where the agent's principal knows all the material 
circumstances and consents to what is done.
Our consultees agreed with our provisional view that there 
should be no distinction between public and non-public bodies. 
It was agreed that it is not desirable to have different standards 
and we therefore recommend the abolition of the distinction.
ANCILLARY MATTERS
The investigation of corruption is an integral part in 
successfully proving corruption. We considered whether the 
powers of the police should be extended, either to those enjoyed 
by the Serious Fraud Office or in some other way, in cases of 
corruption. Whilst we accept that an anomaly arises in
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circumstances where a case tails within the remit of the SFO 
but, tor whatever reason, is investigated by the police, we 
concluded that extending the powers of the police would create 
a greater anomaly between cases of corruption and other cases 
of fraud. Additionally, we considered that an extension of police 
powers might be vulnerable to challenge under art. 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. We therefore did not 
recommend that the investigative powers of the police should be 
extended in the case of corruption.
We carefully considered the issue of territorial jurisdiction 
and the new offences of corruption since, as we pointed out, 
corruption has an increasing international element. We 
recommended that the new offences of corruption should be 
included in the list of Group A offences for the purposes of Part 
I of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which extends the jurisdiction 
of the English courts over offences of fraud and dishonesty 
committed abroad.
We recommended that prosecutions for the new offence 
should not require the consent of either the Law Officers or the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. Although we took the view thato
corruption is a serious offence we do not think that it is right to 
say that all instances of corrupt behaviour are sufficiently serious 
to require trial on indictment. We recommended, therefore, 
that the new offences should be triable either way.
In the consultation paper, we asked for views on whether the 
procurement of a breach of duty by deception or threats should 
be criminal. We conclude that, although the present law may not 
deal adequately with such circumstances, they should not be 
caught by the law of corruption. &
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